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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
V.
BRUCE McALPIN,
Defendant and Petitioner
))
)
))
)
)
)
)
)
)
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From the Judgment of the Superior Court of the 
State of California, County of Santa Clara 
The Honorable John A. Flaherty, Judge
and Jury
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Sixth District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a ruling, issued on May 2, 1989 by the 
Sixth District California Court of Appeal (App.Ct.No. H004154), 
affirming the jury's unanimous conviction on November 23, 1987 of 
appellant Mr. Bruce McAlpin (Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. 116671), 
for committing lewd and lascivious acts on a nine-year old child in 
violation of California Penal Code section 288(a). This court granted 
review on August 29, 1989. Appellant challenges two evidentiary 
rulings of the trial court. First, he contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error by admitting the expert testimony of a Los 
Gatos police officer, who testified that: (1) it is not uncommon for 
parents to delay reporting an act of child molest to the authorities; 
and (2) there is no "profile" or stereotype of a child molester. 
Second, appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible
1
error by excluding the testimony of appellant’s character witnesses 
that he was not a sexual deviant, and by restricting their testimony 
to opinion and reputation evidence regarding his character for honesty 
and veracity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Bruce McAlpin met Anita Manley, the mother of the 
complaining witness, at a dance in Santa Clara, California in April or 
May of 1985. (R.T. 152.) Ms. Manley has three children, Stephanie
(then age 9), Valerie (then age 7), and Isaac (then age 1). On or 
about June 8, 1985, the defendant and Ms, Manley went out to dinner 
and dancing in Fremont. That evening, the defendant spent the night 
in his van in the driveway of Ms. Manley’s mother's house, also in 
Fremont. (R.T. 153.) The next day, Ms. Manley, her three children, 
and the defendant spent the morning at this house. Early that 
afternoon, they went to Toys-R-Us to purchase a toy for Stephanie, who 
was celebrating her birthday that day. Afterward, the defendant, Ms. 
Manley, and her three children went to the defendant's house in San 
Jose. (R.T. 156.) The group then proceeded to watch television in 
the defendant’s bedroom on the defendant's bed. Valerie laid on 
defendant's left side, Stephanie laid on his right side, and Ms.
Manley sat at the foot of the bed with Isaac. (R.T. 158-159.) After 
an unconfirmed amount of time, Ms. Manley and Isaac left the room.
Stephanie testified that the defendant initially began touching 
her while her mother was still in the room. (R.T. 202.) According to 
Stephanie, at first he only touched her on the arm, but soon 
thereafter, he started moving his hand around the cuff of her shorts 
and along the elastic of her underwear. (R.T. 202.) Stephanie stated 
that whenever her mother would look in defendant's direction, he would
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stop touching her. (R.T. 203.) Stephanie testified that the 
defendant continued to touch her after her mother left the room.
(R.T. 207.) She also testified that at some point the defendant put 
his finger in her vagina, although she could not remember whether this 
was when her mother was in or out of the room. (R.T. 204.) She 
stated that a few minutes after her mother left, she told the 
defendant that she had to go to the bathroom and went outside to see 
her mother. (R.T. 206.)
Defendant, on the other hand, denied that any lewd touching or 
penetration of Stephanie's vagina had occurred. (R.T. 333.) He 
testified that in fact, Stephanie had moved her hand toward his 
genitals after Ms. Manley had left the room. (R.T. 333.) Defendant 
claimed that he grabbed Stephanie's arm and told her not to touch him 
there, and that Stephanie then got up and left the room without saying 
anything. (R.T- 334.)
Ms, Manley testified that approximately ten minutes after she had 
left the room, Stephanie emerged from the house in a "little bit of a 
hurry" and looked at her with an expression that she had never seen 
before. (R.T. 159.) She indicated that Stephanie looked sick and had 
tears in her eyes. (R.T. 159.) Ms. Manley testified that she 
questioned Stephanie as to what was wrong and Stephanie responded that 
the defendant had put his hand in her "private." (R.T. 160.) Ms. 
Manley then went inside to confront the defendant about this. (R.T. 
160.) She testified that she asked the defendant what was going on, 
and that he denied anything had occurred. (R.T. 161.) According to 
Ms. Manley, the defendant changed the subject by suggesting that they 
all go out for pizza. Ms. Manley testified that she agreed to go 
because she did not know what else to do at this point. (R.T. 161.)
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Ms. Manley did not report the incident to the police. (R.T. 164.)
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that after Ms. Manley 
confronted him with the alleged assault, he explained to her that 
Stephanie had touched his genitals. (R.T. 317.) The defendant then 
testified that he and Ms. Manley too)c Stephanie aside and told her not 
to let this happen again. (R.T. 318.) According to the defendant, it 
was not until after this conversation that he recommended they go out 
to eat. (R.T. 335.)
Ms. Manley testified that she only dated and had sexual relations 
with the defendant once after the alleged molestation. (R.T. 180.) 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he and Ms. Manley in fact 
dated twice after the alleged incident. (R.T. 335.)
Stephanie reported the alleged incident of child molest 
approximately one year later to representatives from the Children's 
Awareness Program, who had given a presentation about child abuse at 
her school. (R.T. 208.) The Children's Awareness Program 
representatives then reported the incident to the authorities. The 
authorities did not investigate the matter until approximately one 
year after it was reported. (R.T. 210.) Bruce McAlpin was indicted
as a result of this investigation.
At the trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Jeffrey 
Miller, an officer from the Los Gatos Police Department trained in 
juvenile law enforcement. Officer Miller testified that: (1) it is 
not uncommon for a parent to delay reporting an alleged incident of 
molestation perpetrated by someone the parent has been dating; and (2) 
there is no "profile" or stereotype of a typical child molester, and 
in fact child molesters are often people the child )cnows and trusts. 
(R.T. 261-64.) Defense counsel objected to the admission of this
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evidence on the grounds that: (1) Officer Miller was not qualified to 
testify as an expert pursuant to California Evidence Code section 801; 
(2) the evidence had no probative value; and (3) even if his testimony 
possessed some probative value, its probative value was outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect under California Evidence Code section 352.
(R.T. 268.) The trial court overruled these objections and admitted 
the testimony on the grounds that: (1) the voir dire examination 
demonstrated that Officer Miller possessed ample qualifications to 
testify as an expert under Evidence Code section 801; (2) the 
testimony was relevant; and (3) the probative value of the testimony 
in light of the facts of the case outweighed any prejudicial effect 
the evidence might have on the defendant. (R.T. 268-69.)
During voir dire examination, defense counsel offered the 
testimony of two of the defendant's former girlfriends, who would have 
testified that, based on their past sexual experiences with the 
defendant and the fact that they had not observed the defendant 
molesting their daughters: (1) the defendant was not a sexual deviant; 
and (2) the defendant was a person of high moral character, (R.T. 
289.) The court declined to admit this evidence on the basis that:
(1) these lay witnesses were not qualified to give their opinions on a 
subject which called for expert testimony; (2) the offered testimony 
related to specific instances of conduct, which, pursuant to 
California Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102, may not be offered to 
prove a trait of the defendant's character and that he acted in 
conformance with this character trait on a specified occasion; and (3) 
the minimal probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect pursuant to California Evidence Code section 352. 
(R.T. 290-94.)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether, in a trial for lewd and lascivious acts upon a nine-year 
old child, the trial court properly admitted a police officer's 
testimony offered by the prosecution as expert opinion evidence, that: 
(a) a parent's delay in reporting his or her child's statement to the 
police that the child has been molested by someone the parent has been 
dating is not uncommon? and (b) there is no child molester "profile,"
or stereotype.
2. Whether, in a trial for lewd and lascivious acts upon a nine-year 
old child, the trial court: (a) properly excluded the testimony of the 
defendant's previous girlfriends that his sexual behavior was not 
deviant; and (b) properly restricted the witnesses* .testimony to 
opinion and reputation evidence regarding the defendant's character 
for honesty and veracity.
3. Whether, assuming the trial court erred in admitting and/or 
excluding testimony, the error is reversible per se, or resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818 (1956).
8UKKRRY OF AR6UHENT
The trial court properly admitted the police officer's testimony 
that it is not uncommon for parents of victims of child molestation to 
delay reporting the incident to the police, and that there is no child
molester stereotype, for three reasons.
First, Officer Miller was qualified to testify as an expert 
witness pursuant to California Evidence Code section 801. Under 
section 801, opinion testimony of expert witnesses is limited to those 
subjects that are sufficiently beyond common experience such that the 
expert's opinion would assist the trier of fact. The opinion also 
must be based on matter perceived or personally known to the witness
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of a type reasonably relied on by an expert in forming an opinion on 
the subject his testimony relates to. Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (West 
1965). Here, the witness clearly met both prongs of this test.
First, the subject matter of Officer Miller's testimony was whether or 
not it was common for a parent to delay reporting an incident of child 
molestation to the police, and whether or not there is a stereotype 
for a child molester. These matters are not within the common 
experience of the average juror. Officer Miller's expert opinion was 
therefore essential to assist the jury in evaluating Ms. Manley's (and 
therefore Stephanie's) credibility, and to assist them in evaluating 
the defendant's testimony free from common misconceptions regarding 
child molesters. Next, the voir dire indicated that Officer Miller's 
expert opinion was based on hundreds of hours of his personal training 
and experience, as well as on generally-accepted articles, books, and 
case studies and conversations with other experts. As such, his 
testimony was based on matter that is reasonably relied on by an
expert when formulating an opinion.
Second, Officer Miller's testimony was properly admitted because 
it was highly relevant to the case. Expert testimony is relevant and 
admissible when offered to rehabilitate or to support the credibility 
of the complaining witness, and to disabuse the jury of widely held 
misconceptions. People v. Bledsoe. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48 (1984); 
People v. Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1098 (1985). Officer 
Miller's expert testimony was relevant because it was offered to 
rehabilitate ans support Ms. Manley's credibility, which in turn 
supported Stephanie's credibility. It also permitted the jury to 
evaluate the credibility of the defendant's testimony divorced from 
popular myths regarding "typical" characteristics of child molesters.
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Third, the trial court properly admitted Officer Miller*s 
testimony on the basis that the probative value of his expert 
testimony in light of the facts of the case substantially outweighed 
its prejudicial effect pursuant to California Evidence Code section 
352. The court's duty under this section is to balance the probative 
value of the offered evidence against its potential of unfair 
prejudice, undue time consumption, and creation of jury confusion. As 
discussed above. Officer Miller's testimony was highly probative on 
the disputed facts of the witnesses' credibility. On the other hand, 
the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant was minimal in 
comparison with the high probative value of the testimony. Officer 
Miller testified as to matters regarding child molestation cases in 
general, and did not discuss the specific facts of the case. His 
testimony also was not unduly time-consuming or confusing.
The trial court also properly excluded the testimony of 
defendant's former girlfriends regarding his past "normal sexual 
behavior," and properly restricted their testimony to opinion and 
reputation evidence regarding his character for honesty and veracity.
First, the trial court correctly concluded that lay persons are 
not qualified to testify regarding the normalcy of an individual's 
sexual behavior, because such testimony is within the realm of expert 
testimony. People v. Spiano. 156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289 (1957). A 
witness may testify in this area only if he has the knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an 
•icpert on the subject of what is normal or deviant human sexual 
behavior. See. Cal. Evid. Code § 720 (West 1965). Here, the 
defendant made no offer of proof of the expert qualifications of his 
former girlfriends, and therefore their testimony as to the
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defendant's prior "normal sexual behavior" was properly excluded.
Second, the character witnesses* testimony regarding the 
defendant's past sexual behavior was also properly excluded on the 
basis that this testimony related to specific instances of conduct. 
California Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102 clearly state that 
evidence of a defendant's character or trait of his character in the 
form of specific instances of conduct is not admissible if offered to 
prove the defendant's conduct on a specified occasion. Since the 
defendant was offering the evidence of his past acts as proof that he 
did not commit the alleged molestation, the evidence was plainly
inadmissible under these sections.
In addition, even if the specific acts testimony was being 
Qffered in support of the defendant's credibility, which is 
permissible, it was properly excluded on the basis that this testimony 
was irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility. Evidence 
of a person's past sexual behavior is collateral to the issue whether 
he or she is a truthful person. The trial court also properly 
restricted the character witnesses' testimony to the specific 
character traits of honesty and veracity on this basis. The 
defendant's character for honesty and veracity was the only character 
trait relevant to his credibility, the only disputed fact of the case. 
Evidence regarding other character traits was therefore irrelevant and
inadmissible.
Furthermore, even assuming this evidence possessed some minor 
probative value, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the prosecution pursuant to 
California Evidence Code section 352. "Admitting evidence of the 
defendant's relationships with former girlfriends would not only have
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been very time-consuming, it also would have had the potential to 
confuse and distract the jury from the facts at issue in the case. 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
the character witnesses* specific acts testimony, and in limiting 
their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence.
Finally, assuming the trial court erred in the admission and/or 
exclusion of evidence, the errors are not reversible per se, nor did 
they result in a miscarriage of justice under People v, Watson. 46 
Cal. 2d 818 (1956). The errors are not reversible per se because they 
did not deny the defendant his right to a fair trial. He was still 
permitted to be tried before a jury and an impartial judge, to present 
evidence in support of his defense, and to cross-examine the 
prosecution's witnesses. The errors also did not result in a 
miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. It is not reasonably 
probable that a more favorable result would have been reached even if 
the prosecution's expert testimony were excluded, and the defendant's 
proffered character evidence were admitted, because there was other 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict. Therefore, this court 
should not disturb the jury's verdict assuming the trial court did err 
in the admission and/or exclusion of evidence.
ARGUKENT
I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING OFFICER MILLER'S EXPERT 
TESTIMONY BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 801, IT WAS RELEVANT, AND ITS PROBATIVE 
VALUE OUTWEIGHED ITS POTENTIAL PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
Officer Miller was qualified to testify as an expert witness on
the subject of child molestation pursuant to Evidence Code section
801. Officer Miller's testimony was also admissible because it was
highly relevant to support and rehabilitate Ms. Manley's credibility.
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Her testimony in turn was relevant to support the complaining witness' 
credibility. The testimony was also relevant to assist the trier of 
fact in evaluating the credibility of the defendant's testimony free 
from the constraints of common misconceptions regarding child 
molesters. Finally, the trial court properly weighed the probative 
value of the officer's testimony against its potential for unfair 
prejudice pursuant to California Evidence Code section 352, and 
determined that the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.
A. Officer Miller's Expert Testimony Was Admissible Because The
Sub1ect_0f Child Molestation Is Beyond The Common Experience
Of The Jury And The Testimony Would Assist The Jury.
Officer Miller's testimony was admissible because it satisfied 
the first prong of the test for admissibility of expert opinion 
testimony under Evidence Code section 801. Section 801(a) provides 
that an expert testimony in the form of an opinion is admissible if 
the subject is "sufficiently beyond common experience" that the 
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of the fact. Cal. Evid. 
Code § 801(a) (West 1965). This court has recently held that an 
expert's opinion should be excluded under this section "only when it 
would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information." 
People v. Stoll. 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1154 (1989) (Emphasis in original).
Several California courts have held that testimony on the issue 
of child molestation is sufficiently beyond common experience to be 
admissible as expert testimony. People v. Stark. 213 Cal. App. 3d 
107, 110 (1989); People v. Dunnahoo. 152 Cal. App. 3d 575, 577 (1984). 
In People v. Stark, the court held that a psychologist's expert 
testimony regarding "child abuse accommodation syndrome" was properly 
admitted and relevant to explain why victims of sexual assault often
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delay in reporting incidents of abuse. StarX, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 
110. Similarly, in People v. Dunnahoo, two police officers were 
permitted to testify as expert witnesses that, based on their training 
and experience, sexually molested children usually find it very 
difficult to talk about their sexual experiences with an adult. 
Dunnahoo. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577. The court stated that the 
officers' testimony was admissible as expert opinion testimony because 
child molestation is a subject sufficiently beyond common experience 
that the opinion of an expert would assist the jury.
The present case is analogous to Stark and Dunnahoo. As in those 
cases, Officer Miller was called by the prosecution to give expert 
opinion testimony, based on his training and experience, on the 
subject of child molestation. In Stark and Dunnahoo, the officers 
testified that it is not unusual for the victims of child molestation 
to delay reporting an incident of child molest and to be reluctant to 
talk about their sexual experiences. Similarly, Officer Miller 
testified that it is not unusual for parents of victims of child 
molestation to delay reporting the incident to the police. The 
sensitivities of victims and the sensitivities of their parents are 
closely connected: a sexually molested child finds it difficult to 
talk about the molestation with an adult, just as a parent of such a 
child finds it difficult to talk about the molestation with the 
authorities. Officer Miller testified that there are a number of 
reasons why parents might delay reporting an incident of child molest, 
such as feeling shameful, fear of the relationship breaking up, or 
fear of causing a family conflict. Such knowledge is beyond the 
common experience of the average juror. Because of this. Officer 
Miller's expert opinion was essential to assist the jury in evaluating
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the credibility of Ms. Manley's testimony, which in turn was crucial 
to assist them in evaluating the credibility of Stephanie's testimony. 
Officer Miller's testimony therefore satisfied the requirements of 
Evidence Code section 801(a).
Officer Miller's testimony that there is no stereotype for a 
child molester was also admissible under Evidence Code section eoi(a). 
This evidence was offered to dispel common misconceptions the average 
juror may hold regarding "typical” characteristics of child molesters. 
His testimony therefore by definition was related to a subject beyond 
common experience.
Officer Miller's testimony is analogous to that offered in People 
v. Bledsoe. 36 Cal. 3d 235 (1984). In Bledsoe. a rape counselor was 
called by the prosecution to testify as an expert witness that, in her 
opinion, the victim was suffering from "rape trauma syndrome." Id. at 
243-44. The court held that her expert testimony was admissible to 
disabuse the jury of widely held misconceptions about rape and rape 
victims, so that the jury could evaluate the evidence "free of the 
constraints of popular myths." Id. Similarly, in People v. Bow)cer. 
203 Cal. App. 3d 385 (1988), the court held that an expert 
psychologist's testimony was admissible to dispel common 
misconceptions of the jury regarding sexually abused children's 
reaction to the abuse, provided that the expert testimony was narrowly 
tailored to the purpose it was admissible for, and the prosecution 
identified the myth or misconception the testimony was designed to 
rebut. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 394.
Just as there are common misconceptions about victims of rape and 
child abuse, there are also misconceptions about the perpetrators of 
such crimes. Officer Miller testified during the voir dire
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examination that most people think of child molesters as strangers who 
use physical force. However, he testified that, contrary to this 
common belief, statistics show that only ten and one half percent of 
all molestations are actually perpetrated by strangers, and that most 
child molesters do not use physical force, but rather use seduction 
methods. Officer Miller's testimony was narrowly tailored to disabuse 
the jury of these common misconceptions, thus enabling them to 
evaluate the defendant's testimony free from such illusions. The 
prosecution also indicated that the officer's testimony was offered 
for this purpose. Therefore, because his testimony was beyond the 
jury's common experience and was of assistance to the jury, it 
satisfied the requirements for admissibility under Evidence Code
section 801(a).
« officer Miller's Testimony Was Admissible Because Jt
pacied On Matter Upon Which Experts Mav Reasonably Fejy.
Officer Miller's testimony was admissible because it also
satisfied the second prong of the test for admissibility of expert
opinion testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 801. Section
801(b) provides that opinion testimony of an expert witness must be:
based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, 
evoerience, training, and education) perceived by or 
oersonally known to the witness..-that is of type that 
reasonably may be relied on by an expert in forming an 
opinion on the subject to which his testimony relates...
Cal. Evid. Code § 801(b) (West 1965).
Officer Miller's testimony that it is not unusual for parents to
delay reporting an incident of child molest and that there is no child 
molester stereotype was based on his extensive personal knowledge, 
experience, and training, on his study of generally-accepted books, 
articles, and case studies, and on his conversations with other
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experts. *The lengthy voir dire revealed that Officer Miller had four 
years of experience as an investigative officer for the Juvenile 
Services Bureau of the Los Gatos Police Department. During this time, 
he had between 350 and 400 hours of specialized training dealing with 
juveniles, juvenile law, and child abuse. He had also taken a forty- 
hour juvenile law enforcement training course, and had personally 
handled over 100 child abuse cases. Officer Miller also had 
previously been qualified as an expert in California Superior Court on 
the subject of sexual and physical abuse. Finally, Officer Miller had 
studied numerous books, articles, and case studies that were accepted 
and used by other experts involved in the field of child molestation, 
and regularly consulted with other experts in the field. These facts 
amply demonstrate that Officer Miller's testimony was based on matter 
perceived or personally known to him of a type on which experts may 
reasonably rely. Furthermore, the sufficiency of the showing of a 
witness' qualifications to testify as an expert is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court's ruling must not 
be disturbed unless manifest abuse of discretion is shown, people v. 
Kelly. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 39 (1976). As demonstrated by Officer Miller's 
substantial qualifications as an expert, no abuse of discretion was 
shown here.
C, Officer Miller’s Testimony Was Admissible Because It Was
Relevant And Its Probative Value Outweighed Its Potentj.al
Prejudicial Effect.
Officer Miller's testimony was also properly admitted because it 
was highly relevant to the case. "Relevant evidence" is defined by 
California Evidence Code section 210 as "evidence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having 
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
15
Cal. Evid. Code §of consequence to the determination of the action.”
210 (West 1965). All relevant evidence is admissible. Cal. Evid.
Code S 351 (West 1965). Evidence is relevant when it logically or 
naturally tends to prove any disputed material fact; the evidence need 
not prove the fact conclusively. People v. Yu, 143 Cal. App. 3d 358, 
376 (1983); People v. Cordova, 97 Cal. App. 3d 665, 669 (1979). The 
relative strength or weakness of the evidence is to be determined by 
the jury. Cordova. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 669. As with the admission of 
expert testimony, wide discretion is left to the trial court in 
determining whether evidence is relevant or not. People v. Hess, 104 
Cal. App. 2d 642, 676 (1951). Expert testimony is relevant and 
admissible when offered to rehabilitate and to support the credibility 
of the complaining witness, and to disabuse the jury of widely held 
misconceptions. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248 (1984); People 
V. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099 (1985).
Officer Miller's expert testimony was relevant because it was 
offered for these permissible purposes and had a logical tendency to 
prove or disprove the disputed material facts of the witnesses' 
credibility. First, his testimony had a reasonable tendency to prove 
the credibility of Ms, Manley's testimony. Her testimony in turn had 
a reasonable tendency to prove Stephanie's credibility, which was the 
key disputed fact in the case. On cross-examination of Ms. Manley, 
the defendant attacked Ms. Manley's credibility, implying that because 
she did not report the incident to the police immediately, she did not 
believe that her daughter had been molested and thought her daughter 
was lying. Officer Miller's testimony that many parents delay 
reporting an incident of abuse was offered to rehabilitate and support 
Ms. Manley's credibility. Secondly, as discussed above, the evidence
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was also relevant to dispel widely held misconceptions of the average 
juror regarding "typical” characteristics of child molesters. Officer 
Miller's testimony that there is no child molester stereotype was 
crucial for enabling the jury to evaluate the credibility of the 
defendant's testimony (the other key disputed fact in the case) free 
from the misconception that child molesters are only aggressive
strangers.
The trial court does have the discretion to exclude an expert's 
testimony if:
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading 
the jury.
Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (West 1965). However, if the trial court 
determines that the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect, this 
determination should not be overturned unless manifest abuse of 
discretion is shown. People v- Sassounian, 182 Cal. App. 3d 361, 402 
(1986) . In addition, the more substantial the probative value of the 
offered evidence, the greater must be the danger that an excluding 
factor will be present to support an exercise of the trial court's 
discretion excluding the evidence. |(essler v. Gray/ 77 Cal. App. 3d 
284, 291 (1978).
Here, the trial court made an explicit determination that the 
probative value of Officer Miller's testimony was not substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This ruling was not an abuse of 
discretion. First, the probative value of Officer Miller's testimony 
was high, because it supported the credibility of the key witnesses in 
the case, and assisted the jury in understanding the subject of child
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molestation, which is beyond the jury's common experience.
Furthermore, there are public policy considerations that weigh in 
favor of admitting this kind of evidence. Parents of molested 
children should be encouraged to report incidents of child molestation 
to the authorities to ensure that child molesters are prosecuted and 
to deter other would-be child molesters. If the courts permit the 
testimony of parents who do not immediately report an incident of 
abuse to be attacked in court without providing the prosecution an 
adequate means of rebuttal, parents will be discouraged from 
prosecuting child molestation cases. To avoid such an undesirable 
result, courts should be allowed to freely admit evidence which 
rehabilitates the credibility of the parents who do choose to testify.
Second, because Officer Miller's testimony was highly probative, 
it must have presented a similarly high danger of unfair prejudice in 
order for it to have been properly excluded by the trial court on the 
basis of a section 352 objection. However, the potential prejudicial 
effect of the testimony was slight here in comparison with its high 
probative value. Officer Miller did not investigate or have any 
knowledge of the specific facts of this case. His testimony made no 
reference to this case, but rather was based on the hundreds of other 
child abuse cases he had investigated, the numerous reports and 
articles he had studied, and on his discussions with other experts on 
the issue. Thus, cases holding that a significant danger of unfair 
prejudice exists when an expert discusses the specific facts of the 
case being tried do not apply here. People y. pjedsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 
235, 251 (1984); People v. Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1095 (1985) 
In Bledsoe, this court held that expert testimony is not admissible 
when offered to prove that the charged offenses had occurred.
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Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251. Similarly, in ppscoe, an appellate court 
held that it was error to admit a psychologist's expert testimony 
which in essence stated that the particular victim should be believed. 
Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1095. However, the Roscoe court also held 
that the danger of unfair prejudice was alleviated when the expert
discussed victims as a class. Id. at 1100. Here, the expert 
testimony was not offered to prove that Ms. Manley should be believed, 
or that the defendant had actually molested Stephanie. Rather, the 
testimony was offered to rehabilitate and support Ms. Manley's 
credibility and to dispel common misconceptions regarding child
molesters. In addition, the testimony merely referred to parents of 
victims of child molestation and child molesters as a class, and not 
to Ms. Manley or the defendant in particular. Finally, for similar 
reasons, there was little danger that Officer Miller's testimony would 
be unduly time consuming, would confuse the issues, or would mislead 
the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the officer's expert testimony pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352.
II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER WITNESSES REGARDING THE DEFEND;^T S PAST 
SEXUAL CONDUCT AND PROPERLY RESTRICTED ^HEIR TESTIMONY TO OPINION 
AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE REGARDING HIS CHARACTER FOR HONESTY AND 
VERACITY.
The testimony of the defendant's lay character witnesses that the 
defendant was not a sexual deviant and did not exhibit lewd conduct on
prior occasions was properly excluded because this testimony was 
within the realm of expert testimony. Furthermore, the character 
witnesses' testimony was properly restricted to opinion and reputation 
evidence regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity. 
The excluded testimony was offered as evidence of the defendant's
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character in the form of specific instances conduct to prove that he 
did not commit the crime charged, which is prohibited under California 
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102. Finally, the proffered 
testimony was irrelevant to the material issue whether the defendant 
committed the crime charged, and even if slightly relevant, its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by its potential 
prejudicial effect.
. The Trial P'-^r,er1v Excluded Lav Testimony As To Tbege!;„L^Lhavior pLause This Ts ft Subject
Peeerved Evciusivelv For Expert Testimo,ny.
The proffered testimony of the defendant's ordinary character 
witnesses that, in their opinion, the defendant was a person who 
exhibited "normal sexual behavior" which was not lewd or deviant was 
properly excluded by the trial court, because lay persons are not 
qualified to testify on the subject of sexual deviance. It is well 
established that only an expert is qualified to testify in the area of 
sexual and other psychological disorders. See, e^, v.
62 cal. 2d 791, 800-01 (1965) (a trained psychologist or medical 
expert is qualified to testify as to defendant's insanity); and Eepple 
V. .Tones. 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225 (1954) (exclusion of testimony of expert 
psychiatrist that defendant was not a sexual deviant was error). A 
witness may testify as an expert only if he has special )cnowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as 
an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. Cal. Evid. 
code S 720(a) (West 1965). An expert's opinion also must be based on 
matter perceived or personally known to him of a type that may 
reasonably be relied on by an expert in forming an opinion. Cal. 
Evid. code § 801(b) (West 1965). This includes such items as medical 
treatises and records, prown v. Colm, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 644 (1974).
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The sufficiency of the showing of a witness* qualifications to testify 
as an expert is a natter resting largely within the discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling must not be disturbed on appeal unless 
manifest abuse of discretion is shown. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 
24, 39 (1976).
The holding in People v. Spiano. 156 Cal. App. 2d 279 (1957), 
illustrates these principles. The defendant in Spigno was also 
charged with sexually molesting a nine-year old girl in violation of 
Penal Code section 288(a). The appellate court upheld the trial 
court’s exclusion of testimony offered by defendant's witness, a lie 
detector technician and qualified psychologist, regarding the 
defendant's normal, non-deviant sexual behavior. Id. at 288-89. The 
court held that the exclusion of the defendant's evidence was proper 
because the competency of expert opinion in the field of sexual 
psychopathy is limited to persons who have medical and psychological 
training, and the defendant's counsel had failed to offer proof that 
the witness was qualified to give an expert opinion. Id.*.
In this case, as in Spiano. the defendant failed to make an offer 
of proof as to the character witnesses' qualifications to testify as 
experts. The defendant's witnesses were former girlfriends who would 
have based their opinions on their personal interactions with the 
defendant. Far from being persons with knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education sufficient to qualify them as experts on the 
subject of sexual deviance, the defendant's proffered witnesses were 
individuals with no special training or )cnowledge on this subject 
whatsoever. Further, their opinions were not based on matter that 
could reasonably be relied on by an expert witness, such as medical 
studies and medical data, but merely on their own personal
21
observations. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in limiting their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence 
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, and as 
such the ruling may not be overturned.
The cases cited by the defendant are distinguishable from this 
case. In PennlP v. Stoll. 49 Cal. 3d 1136 (1989), another case 
involving violation of Penal Code section 288(a), this court held that 
it was prejudicial error to exclude a psychologist's expert opinion 
that the defendants were not sexually deviant, because such evidence 
is relevant character evidence pursuant to California Evidence Code 
section 1102. Idi at 1152. The holding in StPll is fully consistent 
with the trial court's ruling here, because the issue in that case was 
not whether the defense's witness was not qualified to testify as an 
expert; rather, the issue was whether the trial court properly 
excluded the evidence on the grounds that the proffered testimony 
violated special restrictions governing the admission of new or 
experimental scientific techniques. Thus, Stoll's holding is not 
contrary to the conclusion that, without an offer of proof of the 
witness' expert qualifications, lay opinion testimony regarding the 
defendant's sexual deviance is improper and inadmissible.
The other case cited by defendant is also distinguishable from 
this case. in ppr'pIP v. Deletto. 147 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1983), a case 
involving prosecution for an act of forcible oral copulation pursuant 
to Penal Code section 288a(c), the appellate court held that the trial 
court properly admitted the testimony of the victim's two foster 
mothers regarding their observations of the minor's previous aberrant 
sexual behavior, without an offer of proof of their expert 
qualifications. at 479. However, in Deletto, the evidence was
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offered not to show that the defendant committed the acts in question, 
but to rebut an inference that one of the foster mothers had 
fabricated the entire story. Deletto, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 479. In 
contrast, in this case, the defense's evidence was not offered to 
rebut an inference that Ms. Manley or Stephanie had fabricated the 
story; rather, it was offered to prove that the defendant did not 
commit the act of molestation on Stephanie. Therefore, PeleUo does 
not support the argument that lay witnesses' opinion testimony that 
the defendant has previously exhibited normal sexual behavior is
admissible.
In sum, both statutory and case law support the trial court's 
ruling that the testimony of lay persons regarding a defendant's 
sexual deviance is inadmissible because it is within the realm of
expert testimony.
B Assuming That lav Witnesses Are Qualified To Testify^
The Rnb-ier^t Of Sexual Behavior. Testimony Regarding The
C Past Sexual Conduct Was Properly Excluded
i.--- - ,^h.-.-a,~heT Bvidence In The Form Of Specific Instances
nf rnndur-t Ts Inadmissible If Offered To Prove The Defendant
Not Commit The Crime Charged.
Even assuming the defendant's lay witnesses were qualified to
testify on the subject of the defendant's prior "normal sexual 
behavior," the trial court properly excluded this evidence and 
properly limited the witnesses' testimony to opinion and reputation 
evidence of the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, based 
on provisions of the California Evidence Code governing admission of 
character evidence. Section 1101(a) provides that:
except as provided...in [section] 1102...evidence of a 
person's character or trait of his or her character (whether 
in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or 
evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is 
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a 
specified occasion.
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Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1990). Section 1102(a) in turn 
provides that:
evidence of the defendant's character or traits of his 
character in the form of an opinion or evidence of bis 
reputation is not made inadmissible by section 1101 if such 
evidence is:
(a) offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in 
conformity with such character or trait of his character.
Cal. Evid. Code § 1102(a) (West 1965) (Emphasis added). Thus, the
statutes plainly exclude the admission of evidence of a defendant's
character or traits of his character in the form of specific instances
of conduct, when offered to prove that the defendant acted in
conformance with that character or trait on a particular occasion.
See. also. People v. Wagner. 13 Cal. 3d 612, 619 (1975) (evidence of
specific acts of the accused are, as a general rule, inadmissible to
prove his disposition to commit such acts).
In this case, the defense proffered the testimony of two former
girlfriends that, during the times they had observed the defendant, he
had exhibited "normal sexual behavior" by not acting in a lewd or
deviant manner and by not molesting their daughters. Because this
testimony related to specific instances of conduct which was offered
to prove: (1) that the defendant possessed the character of person who
was not a sexual deviant or a child molester; and (2) that he had
acted in conformity with this character on the occasion in question,
this testimony was plainly inadmissible under Evidence Code sections
1101 and 1102.
Furthermore, none of the exceptions to the bar against 
admissibility of evidence of a defendant's character in the form of 
specific instances of conduct apply here. First, Evidence Code 
section 1101(b) provides that evidence that a person committed an act.
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offered to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or 
accident) other than that person's disposition to commit the act, is 
admissible. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1965). However, the 
evidence here was not offered to prove any fact other than the 
defendant's disposition not to commit an act of child molestation. 
Facts such as the defendant's motive, intent, or identity were not at 
issue in this case. The only material issue was whether the defendant 
had in fact committed the act in question. Second, evidence of 
specific instances of conduct is also admissible to rebut evidence 
introduced by the prosecution that impeaches the defendant's 
character. Law Revision Commission Comment to Evid. Code § 1102.
Here, the prosecutor did not attempt to impeach the defendant's 
character, but only introduced evidence contrary to the defendant's 
testimony. It is well established that the introduction of evidence 
that simply contradicts the defendant's testimony does not impeach his 
character. people v. Tavlor. 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 630 (1986). Thus, 
this exception to the bar against admissibility of specific instances 
of conduct is also inapplicable. A final exception to the 
inadmissibility of specific acts evidence applies when a defendant's 
character is an ultimate fact in dispute, i.e., when character is a 
material element of the crime charged, such as in libel or child 
custody cases. Law Revision Commission Comment to Evid. Code § 1100; 
In Re Dorothy L. , 162 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (1984). However, in 
this case, the defendant's character was not at issue because it did 
not bear on whether he was telling the truth about not committing the 
crime charged. Only the defendant's credibility was in dispute.
The defendant argues, however, that the proffered character
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evidence, rather than being offered to prove that he acted in 
conformance with a certain character trait on a specified occasion, 
was being offered in support of his credibility. This court has 
recently held that evidence of specific instances of conduct, when 
offered in support of a defendant's credibility, is admissible in a 
criminal trial as a result of the enactment of section 28(d) of 
article I of the California Constitution (the "Right to Truth in 
Evidence" provision of Proposition 8). People v, Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 
1047, 1081 (1989). Section 28(d) effected a "pro tanto repeal" of 
California Evidence Code sections 786 and 787, which formerly provided 
that evidence of specific instances of conduct offered to attac)c or 
support the credibility of a witness was inadmissible. Although such 
evidence is now admissible, it nevertheless must be relevant to a 
witness' credibility. £ee. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 210 and 350 (West 
1965). The test of relevancy in the context of credibility is whether 
the evidence will aid the trier of fact in appraising the witness' 
credibility and in assessing the probative value of the witness' 
testimony. People v. Serqill. 138 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40 (1982). Thus, 
if a reasonable trier of fact could believe that the evidence would be 
sufficient to have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove the 
witness' credibility, then the evidence is relevant and should be 
admitted. Id^
Here, the evidence of specific instances of conduct was not 
relevant to the issue of the defendant’s credibility, and was 
therefore properly excluded. No reasonable trier of fact would have 
believed that evidence of the defendant past sexual behavior would 
have any bearing on the issue of whether he was telling the truth 
about not committing the crime charged. Evidence that a person acted
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in a certain way in the past, with the exception of evidence tending 
to show that he told the truth or otherwise acted with integrity, does 
not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove that he is a 
credible person.
The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 
restricting the character witnesses* testimony to opinion and 
reputation evidence, regardless of whether the evidence was offered to 
show that the defendant did not commit the act in question, or whether 
it was offered in support of his credibility,
C. The Testimony Of The Defendant*s Past Sexual Behavior Was
ftlso Properly Excluded Because Such Testimony Was
TT-f«=>levant. And Even If Slightly Relevant, The Probative
Value Of The Testimony Was Outweighed Bv Its Prejudicial
Effect.
The trial court also properly excluded testimony regarding the 
defendant's prior sexual conduct, and properly restricted the 
character witnesses* testimony to opinion and reputation evidence as 
to the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, based on 
provisions of the California Evidence Code prohibiting the admission 
of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. First, because evidence of 
specific instances of the defendant's past sexual conduct and of 
character traits other than honesty and veracity did not have a 
reasonable tendency to prove or disprove the material issue whether 
the defendant was telling the truth about not committing the crime 
charged, the evidence was properly excluded as irrelevant under 
California Evidence Code section 350. Secondly, even assuming 
arguendo that the excluded testimony possessed some minor probative 
value as to whether the defendant committed the crime charged, the 
probative value of the offered evidence was substantially outweighed 
by the testimony's potential prejudicial effect on the prosecution
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under California Evidence Code section 352.
1, yestimonv regarding specific instances of defendant's
past sexual conduct does not meet the fundamental
relevancy reguirements for admissibility.
California Evidence Code section 210 defines "relevant evidence" 
as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any 
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action. Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1965). Relevant evidence is also 
defined as evidence that tends logically, naturally, or by reasonable 
inference to establish a material fact, p^opl? y, YU> 143 Cal. App.
3d 358, 376 (1983). California Evidence Code section 350 provides 
that "no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence." Cal. Evid. 
Code § 350 (West 1965). This rule excludes evidence of all collateral 
facts or facts that are incapable of affording any reasonable 
presumption or inference as to the principal fact or matter in 
dispute. firlotte v. Jessee, 76 Cal. App. 2d 207, 210 (1946). For 
example, evidence of past conduct that occurs an unreasonable period 
before the trial may be properly excluded as remote and irrelevant.
V. HicKs. 249 Cal. App. 2d 964, 968 (1967). Furthermore, in 
order for reputation and opinion evidence to be admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1102, it must be relevant to the charged 
offense. Pponle V. Qui Mei Lee. 48 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526 (1975).
Wide discretion is left to the trial judge in determining whether 
evidence is admissible, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 376, although a trial
judge must give a defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt when 
passing on the admissibility of evidence, peppi? v. Wright, ^9 Cal.
3d 576, 584 (1985). An evidentiary ruling of the trial court must not 
be overturned unless manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Eelly, 17 
Cal. 3d at 39.
28
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting 
the proffered testimony of the defense's character witnesses to 
opinion and reputation evidence because evidence of the defendant's 
specific past acts does not satisfy the test for relevancy. The same 
conclusion obtains even upon giving the defendant the benefit of any 
reasonable doubt as to the evidence's admissibility. Testimony that 
the defendant exhibited "normal sexual behavior" and did not molest 
the daughters of other women the defendant dated briefly in the past 
does not have any tendency in reason to prove that the defendant did 
not commit the alleged molestation on or about June 9, 1985. The 
defendant may not have molested innumerable other children and yet 
still committed the crime charged. Furthermore, the one former 
girlfriend of the defendant who actually testified stated that she had 
met the defendant approximately one full year prior to the alleged 
molestation, and had only dated him about four or five months. This 
fact alone significantly diminishes the probative value of her 
specific acts testimony, since she had not observed the defendant 
recently enough or known him long enough to make and accurate 
assessment of his conduct. When this fact is considered in 
conjunction with the fact that the specific acts testimony was 
collateral to the material issue whether the defendant committed the 
crime charged, it is clear that this evidence possessed no probative 
value and was irrelevant. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in limiting the character witnesses' testimony to
opinion and reputation evidence.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in restricting
the character witness' testimony to the specific character traits of 
honesty and veracity, and in excluding the offered testimony regarding
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the defendant's character for normal sexual behavior. The only 
material issue of the case was whether the defendant was telling the 
truth about not committing the alleged offense; his character for 
normal sexual behavior was not at issue. Therefore, evidence of 
character traits other than honesty and veracity was irrelevant and 
inadmissible.
2. Even assuming that the character witnesses* specific 
acts testimony possessed some probative value, its
probative value was outweighed bv its potential
prejudicial effect.
California Evidence Code section 352 permits a trial court 
to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the probability that its admission will either: (1) necessitate 
undue consumption of time; or (2) create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. Cal. 
Evid. Code § 352 (West 1965). As with other evidentiary rulings, wide 
discretion is afforded the trial judge in determining whether to 
exclude evidence under this section. People v. Sassounian, 182 Cal. 
App. 3d 361, 402 (1986). Under section 352, the prosecution as well 
as the defense is afforded protection from the use of prejudicial 
evidence with little probative value. Wriaht, 39 Cal. 3d at 585. 
However, to protect the defendant's constitutional due process rights, 
the alleged prejudice to the prosecution cannot be based on mere 
speculation or conjecture, and evidence that is relevant to the prime 
theory of the defense cannot be excluded simply because the trial 
would be simpler without it. Id. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
that the defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant 
evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value; 
rather, the trial court always retains its discretion to exclude
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evidence with only minor probative value pursuant to Evidence Code 
section 352. Peome V. Reeder. 82 Cal. App. 3d 543, 553 (1978).
This court's holding in. Wright, a case involving an appeal from a 
first degree murder conviction, is illustrative of these principles, 
griabt, 39 cal. 3d 576. In Wright, the defendant offered evidence, in 
support of his defense of self-defense, that the victim had been under 
the influence of heroin during an arrest which had occurred two years 
prior to the murder. Isi. at 582. This court upheld the trial court's 
exclusion of the evidence on the grounds that its minor probative 
value, due to its remote and collateral nature, was outweighed by its 
potential prejudicial effect on the prosecution's case. Hright, 39 
cal. 3d at 585. A trial court's exclusion of a defendant's character 
evidence was similarly upheld on the basis of a section 352 objection 
in V- covino. 100 cal. App. 3d 660, 666 (1980). In £220110, an
assault and battery case, the trial court excluded evidence of the 
victim's aggressive sexual behavior with men other than the defendant 
on the grounds that its slight probative value was outweighed by the 
possibility that such evidence would confuse the issues and consume an
undue amount of time.
Here, even assuming arguendo that the specific acts evidence 
offered by the defendant possessed some slight probative value 
regarding the issue whether he in fact committed the crime charged, 
the evidence was nevertheless properly excluded by the trial Dudge on 
the basis that the evidence's minor probative value was substantially 
outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. If the character 
witnesses had been allowed to testify as to each instance they 
Observed the defendant did not act in a lewd or lustful manner, then 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1102, the prosecution would have
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been permitted to rebut this evidence through its own character 
witnesses. See. Law Revision Commission Comment to section 1102. The 
defendant in turn would have been able to respond to this testimony, 
and so on. This would have effectively created a "mini-trial" 
resulting in undue time consumption, confusion of the issues, and 
misleading of the jury. This is precisely the reason why evidence of 
specific instances of conduct is excluded under Evidence Code section 
1102. See. Law Revision Commission Comment to section 1102. The fact 
that the California Legislature deemed the potential prejudicial 
effect of specific acts evidence significant enough to warrant passage 
of a rule of evidence barring its admission is sufficient proof that 
the potential prejudice to the prosecution in this case was not based 
on mere conjecture. Further, the testimony excluded by the trial 
court was not essential to the defendant's defense and did not impair 
the defendant's due process rights. The trial court did not bar the 
testimony of the defendant's character witnesses altogether, but 
merely restricted their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence 
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity. Since 
these were the only character traits relevant to the material issue of 
whether the defendant committed the crime charged, the trial court's 
ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion and should be upheld.
III. ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN ADMITTING OFFICER MILLER'S
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND IN RESTRICTING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S
CHARACTER WITNESSES, THESE ERRORS WERE NOT REVERSIBLE PER SE, NOR
DID THEY RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE REQUIRING REVERSAL,
Assuming the trial court did commit an error by: (1) admitting 
the expert testimony of Officer Miller; and/or (2) excluding evidence 
of prior specific instances of the defendant's conduct and restricting 
the character witnesses' testimony to the character traits of honesty
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and veracity, this error does not require reversal of the jury's 
verdict, under either the "reversible per se" or the harmless error 
standards.
A. The Alleged Errors Were Not Prejudicial Per Se.
A trial court's error is "prejudicial per se" when the error was 
egregious enough to render the trial "fundamentally unfair." People 
y. Hedaecock, 51 Cal. 3d 395, 410 (1990). Errors have been found to 
be "prejudicial per se" in cases where the defendant's confession was 
wrongfully introduced, People v. McClarv. 20 Cal. 3d 218, 230 (1977), 
the defendant was denied the right to a jury trial, Selby Constructors 
MrCarthv, 91 Cal. App. 3d 517, 527 (1979), the case was adjudicated 
by a biased judge, People v. Hover, 48 Cal. 3d 247, 279-80 (1989), or 
the defendant's fundamental constitutional due process rights were 
violated in some other fashion.
This case involved no such egregious violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights. Neither the admission of Officer Miller's 
testimony nor the exclusion of the character witnesses' testimony 
resulted in an error egregious enough to be reversible per se. The 
defendant was not denied a jury trial. There was no evidence that he 
was tried before a biased judge. The defendant was permitted to call 
witnesses in his defense and to cross-examine the prosecution's 
witnesses. Minor evidentiary issues of the kind involved in the case 
at bar simply do not rise to the level of constitutional error 
required to render a trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the trial 
court's ruling was not reversible per se, assuming it was error.
B, The All^^q^d Errors Were Harmless And Did Not Result In A
Miscarriage Of Justice Requiring Reversal Under The Test Of
People V- Watson.
The other standard used in California to determine whether a
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trial court abused its discretion to an extent that requires reversal 
of the jury's verdict is the "harmless error" standard enunciated in 
p«j>9p1e V. Watson. 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956). If the defendant had 
counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, as the case here, 
there is a strong presumption that any errors that may have occurred 
are subject to the harmless error analysis, pose y. Clark, 478 U.S. 
570, 579 (1986). An error is deemed to be harmless unless a 
"miscarriage of justice" has occurred. Watson. 46 Cal. 2d at 836. A 
miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the court, after 
an examination of all the evidence, is of the opinion that it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant 
would have been reached in the absence of the error.- For
example, in People v. Deletto, 147 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1983), another 
case involving lewd and lascivious acts on a minor, the court held 
that although the trial court erred in permitting the minor's foster 
mother to testify as to the minor's aberrant behavior, the error was 
harmless because this testimony was irrelevant to the issue of the 
minor's sexual conduct, and because there was other evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict. at 480. Therefore, the court held
that it was not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
the defendant would have been reached absent the error.
In this case, assuming the trial court erred in admitting Officer 
Miller's testimony and in excluding the specific acts testimony of the 
defendant's character witnesses, this error was harmless. First, it 
is not reasonably probable that the exclusion of Officer Miller's 
testimony would have resulted in a verdict for the defendant. If this 
court accepts the defendant's argument that the officer's testimony 
was erroneously admitted because the officer was not qualified to
34
testify as an expert and because his testimony was irrelevant, it 
would be inconsistent for it to simultaneously hold that the jury gave 
any weight to this irrelevant testimony in their deliberations.
Second, it is not reasonably probable that the admission of evidence 
of the defendant's prior conduct would have caused the jury to find 
for the defendant, because this evidence was unrelated to the material 
issue whether the defendant committed the crime charged. In addition, 
the defendant was still permitted to present other evidence in support 
of his defense, in the form of opinion and reputation evidence of his 
character for honesty and veracity. Finally, there was other evidence 
that corroborated the complaining witness* testimony and supported the 
jury's verdict, such as Ms. Manley's testimony. Thus, it is not 
reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion even if the defendant's proffered character evidence had 
been admitted. Therefore, assuming the trial court's rulings were in 
error, these errors did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court did not err in the admission of the 
expert testimony of Officer Miller that: (a) a parent's delay in 
reporting his or her child's statement that the child has been 
molested by a person the parent has been dating is not uncommon; and 
(b) there is no child molester "profile" or stereotype. The trial 
court also did not err in excluding the testimony of the defendant's 
previous girlfriends that he was not a sexual deviant, or in 
restricting their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence 
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity.
Finally, assuming the trial court did err in the admission and/or 
exclusion of evidence, this error did not rise to the level of
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reversible error, under either the "reversible per se" or the 
Watson harmless error standard. Therefore, the People 
respectfully request that the trial court's rulings and the 
jury's verdict not be disturbed.
Dated: October 23, 1990
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